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1. Introduction
Every six months the office of the presidency changes
from one member state to another. This means that there
are always three or four countries gearing themselves up
for this prestigious position. The EU presidency2 is,
however, a nebulous function so that this preparation
has to be done carefully and has to be based on a
profound understanding of the roles of the presidency.
As will appear below, the presidency imposes conflicting
demands on member states. They should therefore
possess capacities to combine different – and conflicting
– perspectives and to continuously monitor negotiations
and outcomes. In more specific terms, the presidency
has to be able to combine sector-specific concerns with
neutrality and with the need to provide leadership,
without one or the other being subordinate a priori. It
can therefore be compared to a juggler with three balls
(sets of tasks) up in the air. The kinds of management
challenges this imposes are consequently more stringent
than those faced when European affairs have to be
coordinated under ‘normal’ circumstances. We can
even go one step further: the office of the presidency not
only requires more attention to coordination, but also
imposes different kinds of coordination objectives, and
thus demands different kinds of coordination
mechanisms. While at the helm, the member state should
no longer develop optimal negotiating positions from a
national or sectoral point of view. When not in the chair,
the formulation of the national brief for the negotiators
can usually be left to the individual ministries. However,
the presidency has to take different objectives into
account. These different objectives demand different
coordination systems – instead of merely extrapolating
existing systems.
This paper discusses the roles of the presidency and
what these roles mean in terms of capacities for managing
EU affairs at national level. The arguments expounded
here are, first of all, that preparation for presidency
requires, in addition to the training seminars which
member states already organize, an analysis of the
capacities of administrations to combine substantive
interests with generalist perspectives (defended by, for
instance, Foreign Affairs ministries).3 By focusing on
the conflicting tasks of the presidency, and the
management implications this has, attention is directed
at aspects that usually remain on the sidelines of the
debate on the position of the presidency (as well as on
the reform of this institution).4 The conflicting tasks
impose specific and different coordination needs. If the
coordination mechanisms are well designed they will
upgrade the performance of member states as well as
support the European integration process. Secondly, it
will be argued that the presidency is under-researched.
The three characteristics of the presidency and the
implications these have for its management offer two
interrelated sets of research fields.
Section 2 sketches the specific position the chair has
acquired during the European integration process and
discusses the inherent conflict between neutrality,
leadership and self-interests. Knowing the tasks of the
presidency, the subsequent section can raise questions
concerning the elements that determine effectiveness.
The conflicting expectations, however, impose a need
to look specifically at the management implications
(Section 4). This section also makes a few remarks on
the discussion about changing the presidency. Section 5
draws some conclusions and elaborates two interrelated
lines of research.
2. Evolution and tasks of the presidency: why is
the presidency important?
In order to discuss the management challenges of the
presidency it is necessary to first present the evolution
of the presidency’s functions and its importance. The
current lack of understanding as to why the presidency
is important, and how important it is, indicates its
nebulous nature. Clarity regarding its functions is needed
before discussing the management issues. The complex
tasks of the presidency should have implications for the
way in which officials/politicians discharge their role
and for the way in which countries prepare themselves.
Misconceptions of tasks have led to painful mistakes
and have had an adverse effect on the performance of
presidencies. For example, member states have, on the
one hand, had high expectations of their influence as
presidency and have used the six months to launch
major initiatives, to steer integration in specific
(nationally preferred) directions, to provide leadership,
or, as one official remarked, ‘to put things right in
Europe’.5 On the other hand, there have been those who
emphasize the limits as to what a country can achieve
due to, for example, the limited room for manoeuvre
between the Council, EP and Commission. Over-
estimation and underestimation of the tasks of the
presidency may both be equally harmful. Another sign
of the lack of understanding of the presidency is the fact





* Un bref résumé de cet article en français figure à la fin.3
that even a British quality newspaper noted that Blair
now presides over the 20 Commissioners, and presented
presidency events as ‘European Commission events’.6
Before dealing with the organizational implications
of the presidency, it is therefore useful to start with a
discussion of its roles and tasks.
a. Evolution of the presidency
The functions of the presidency can only be understood
in a historical context. Unlike the Commission or the
European Parliament, the position of the presidency has
not been designed. Instead, its position has developed in
response to new developments in the integration process
and to changes in inter-institutional relations. The
momentous increase in importance becomes clear when
one compares the tasks involved in the description of
the position of the presidency in the Treaties. The
founding treaties, originating from the early 1950s, only
remark that the office of the presidency shall be held in
turn by member states (Article 146) and that it shall
convene meetings (Article 147).
The limited space devoted to the presidency signifies
the federal origin of the European Union. The initial
design of the EU’s forerunner – the ECSC –had not even
foreseen a Council, and consequently no presidency.
The ECSC consisted of a High Authority which could
take decisions (now called the Commission), and which
was controlled by an Assemblée (the EP). A Council was
added at the insistence of, paradoxically, especially the
Netherlands. In the original design the role of the
Council was limited to that of a kind of Upper Chamber.
The role of the Council, and therefore that of the
presidency, has gradually increased. Trends and events
which have contributed to this development include: the
sharpening differences between the member states on
the relation between intergovernmentalism and
supranationalism, a need to search for new targets in the
integration process after the successes of the early
1960s, the weakening of the Commission, the increased
workload, the successive enlargements, the reliance on
summits for coordination of policies and for political
initiatives, and the increased role of the EP.7
The main implications of this have been that the
burden on the presidency has grown in terms of
organizational workload and of chairing meetings. Not
only are more meetings organized now than in the
1960s, the diversity between member states has also
become more pronounced.8 Hence, the role of honest
broker – within the Council as well as between Council,
Commission and EP – has become more important
compared with the initial situation, which was
characterized by relatively clear objectives. In addition,
especially due to the weakening of the Commission, a
leadership gap has been created in the integration process.
Debates on (limiting) the role of the Commission and
the reinforcement of intergovernmentalism gradually
eroded its position.9 Summits and the increased reliance
on presidency compromises are just a few signs of the
increased political function of the presidency. The
meetings of Heads of State and Governments were
organized to take political initiatives, to support decision-
making in the technical Councils and to coordinate
overlap between the various compositions of the
meetings of Ministers. These summits are quite labour-
intensive for the host.
As a result of these developments, there is a heavier
burden on the shoulders of the presidency. It is therefore
possible to conclude that this function has grown by
default rather than by design.10
This brief review of the evolution shows the
conflicting demands imposed on member states holding
the presidency. On the one hand, these trends have
limited the influence of the presidency. Sensitive
relations between member states, combined with the
(even unwritten) rule of consensus, have demanded an
honest broker role from the chair. Moreover, the
interinstitutional interdependence demands that the
presidency carefully handles the relations between the
Council, Commission and EP. On the other hand, also
the political role has become more important due to,
among other things, the leadership gap created by the
weakening of the Commission.11 It is therefore possible
to argue that the presidency’s role is very restricted and
that it has important steering and guiding functions. So,
the confusion seems complete,12 and, as a result, it is
always easy to criticize the presidency for being too
active or too passive (i.e. for emphasizing the leadership
or the broker role).
b. Tasks
The difficulty in determining whether the presidency is
a political function or whether it should be neutral is also
apparent in the list of its tasks. The following functions
are generally mentioned: management and
administration of Council business, agenda-setting,
mediation, initiation, representation, and organization
of summits.13 These functions point to both the neutral
administrative and mediation tasks as well as to the
political agenda-setting and initiation functions.
In addition to these ‘neutrality’ and ‘leadership’14
tasks, the presidency has one additional role and that is
the responsibility to defend national interests. This task
has hardly received any attention, but is nevertheless
omnipresent and can at times make the work of the chair
very complicated. The fact that a member state at the
helm also has national interests and that these affect its
agenda and behaviour is often pushed aside. The
argument for this being that the chair has to be neutral
and that the expression of national objectives reduces its
credibility as honest broker. Ludlow (1995, p.38)
therefore emphasizes that the presidency is, first and
foremost, an office of the Union and not an instrument
to pursue national interests. The country in office should
find the solution instead of being part of the problem. As
a consequence, member states have made major
sacrifices while occupying in the chair and have had to
abandon national priorities.15
However, national interests cannot always be brushed4
aside. It may even be dangerous with a view to national
legitimacy of EU policies and national acceptance of the
presidency role. Moreover, letting presidency concerns
predominate  a priori may lead to implementation
problems later.16 Furthermore, national interests can
find a legitimate and acceptable position on the
presidency agenda and may lead to new initiatives or
debates within the EU. Examples of this include the
attention devoted to the Mediterranean and Northern
dimensions of the EU by Spain and Finland, and the
functioning of the internal market by the UK.17
The tasks and the pulls exerted on the presidency are
summarized in Figure 1. The member state at the helm
somehow has to combine three types of tasks and
expectations: being the neutral broker (i.e. mediation
and representation tasks), providing leadership (e.g.
agenda-setting, developing strategic perspectives), and
representing national interests (given the fact that the
presidency is a political function).




The three sets of expectations are of course
conflicting. The following questions therefore have to
be raised. Where should a member state position itself
within this triangle? Should it opt for one set of tasks or
the other, or should it find a place somewhere in the
middle?
An informed guess would be that most attention has
been given to the administrative tasks – at least in the
presidency literature and in official statements by
member states.18 The position of the Council Secretariat
is also clear in this respect. According to the Presidency
Handbook: ‘The presidency must, by definition, be
neutral and impartial’.19 Of course chairing meetings
and finding solutions among 15 member states, the
Commission and EP demands an honest broker role.20
Partiality destroys the credibility required for the
mediation role, and a long and controversial national
agenda will make constructive cooperation from the
other member states less likely. Hence, the emphasis of
Foreign Affairs ministries on neutrality.
However, neutrality may be rather impractical given
that the presidency is a political function. The EU is not
chaired, as NATO is, by a Secretary-General. This
rotating political function provides member states with
the chance to influence the European agenda and to take
the initiatives they deem opportune. This is one way of
strengthening the legitimacy of the European integration
process. Every member state has seized this opportunity.
Moreover, neutrality may lead to an uninteresting
presidency and look bureaucratic to the public. It may
also be unpopular with the press – which may want to
see an attractive agenda and needs to have something to
write about.21 Neutrality is therefore perhaps not only a
myth, but also undesirable.
The belief in neutrality also leads to the paradox that
ambitious ministries can sometimes be very successful
in achieving results and in maintaining good cooperation
between the member states around the table.22 It is
therefore questionable whether high ambitions
necessarily have a negative impact on outcome.
The political leadership role of the presidency has
received considerably less attention. Nevertheless, it is
possible to argue in favour of reinforcing the political
tasks.23 Albeit not in the context of a discussion on the
presidency De Schoutheete, the former Belgian
Permanent Representative, argues for more vision and
political leadership in the European integration process.
His argument is that there is a tendency to focus on
problems and issues in a fragmented way, and that the
problems are mainly tackled from a national perspective.
However, the major current issues for which solutions
have to be found demand longer-term strategic thinking
from a European perspective (e.g. EMU, enlargement,
connection between the internal market and social policy,
security policy).24 It is easy to argue in this light that, due
to the relatively downbeat role of the Commission, a
strong political leadership role within the Council is
needed to unblock decisions and to provide the required
vision.25
Even less attention has been given to the extent to
which national interests are allowed to interfere. Looking
at the emphasis some Foreign Affairs ministries and the
Council Secretariat have placed on neutrality, it even
seems that this subject has become taboo.
The traditional emphasis on the administrative tasks
indicates the choice of one of the aspects of the presidency
(i.e. ‘taking care of business’). As a corollary, one can
argue that the European integration process has
developed a leadership gap: the Commission is no
longer the powerful motor behind the integration process
and differences between member states have increased
due to the growing heterogeneity within the Council.
Nevertheless, member states have used the presidency
to provide leadership and used the period at the helm to
lobby for national interests, although this fact is not
stressed in official statements. This has often been done
in imprudent and provocative ways. The need to combine
neutrality with working towards the development of
longer-term visions on European integration has not
always been sufficiently acknowledged. Political
leadership and the defence of national interests have
therefore resulted in negative experiences and are now
regarded with suspicion. However, the fact that mistakes
have been made may not lead to the conclusion that
presidencies should only be neutral. Better understanding
of the position of the presidency, and of the challenges
of managing conflicting expectations, may prevent5
member states from resorting to the easy way out (i.e.
the neutral presidency).
The emphasis on neutrality has reinforced low-key
presidencies. Nevertheless, it can be argued that given
the current topics on the agenda (such as enlargement,
budget negotiations, ‘Amsterdam II’, and ensuring a
stable Euro) and the lack of political leadership, the
European integration process demands a reinforcement
of the presidency.
3. Elements of success
The question concerning the tasks leads to the question
of what kinds of capacities are needed to ensure
successful presidencies. To find an answer it is necessary
to first look at what determines success. This seems to
be a simple and straightforward issue. Frequent
references can be found to such elements as mediation
skills, technical expertise, networks, luck, careful
preparation, good people, and neutrality. It is surprising
that little in-depth attention has been devoted in the
literature, or in the world of practitioners, to the
management of the presidency. Despite the ease with
which elements of success are presented, a number of
questions remain open as to whether these characteristics
ensure an effective presidency.
First of all, there is the question of whether neutrality
should be such an overriding priority – as already
discussed above. Secondly, the question has to be
addressed: what makes a successful presidency? Despite
the fact that after each presidency evaluations appear in
the literature and in national parliaments, a satisfactory
answer has not yet been given.26 One of the reasons put
forward as to why it is so hard to evaluate presidencies
is the fact that the outcome depends on 19 Councils and
one or two summits. It is therefore argued that it is hard
to make general statements regarding success or failure.
It also makes a difference who is doing the evaluation
(e.g. MEPs or interest groups with conflicting demands).
Furthermore, evaluations are complicated by the fact
that presidencies depend on rolling agendas and only
have six months at their disposal and a range of different
tasks to perform. Given these difficulties in defining and
measuring success, it is not surprising to find that
various ministries during the Dutch presidency used
different definitions of success, ranging from low-key
objectives of ‘continuity’ and ‘neutrality’ to the more
ambitious ‘output based on results’ while others might
want to judge the outcome against the impetus that has
been given to the integration process (i.e. the leadership
role discussed above).
As was the case in the discussion on the tasks of the
presidency, there is no single or simple definition of
success either. Presidencies are judged on a number of
criteria such as impartiality, efficient handling of
meetings, professional chairmanship, provision of an
attractive agenda, effective – but not irritating – way of
defending national interests, crisis management, and
making a valuable contribution to the European
integration process. Obviously, the emphasis on these
criteria will be contingent upon the specific issues with
which the presidency is confronted.
Given the various ways of evaluating the presidency,
the conclusion is therefore that such assessments should
be based on each of the elements of success. One way to
do this is to assess individual policy areas and characterize
the behaviour of the chair according to the three
dimensions presented in Figure 1.27
Hence, conflicting expectations also emerge in the
discussion on what makes a successful presidency. The
conflicting tasks lead to conflicting criteria by which a
member state will be evaluated. Avoiding the difficulties
and opting for a purely neutral presidency (and evaluating
it accordingly) may not be the best alternative.
4. Managing the presidency
The tensions presented in Figure 1 make it especially
important to look at the organizational capacities of
member states to coordinate conflicting expectations.
The presidency is to a large extent an organizational
function within the EU. The smooth handling of the
agenda requires an efficient and effective way of
preparing topics, coordinating the national position and
ensuring coherence and persistence. Moreover, any
weaknesses in the management of EU affairs within the
member state in office will be visible on a European –
if not global – level. If the management challenges are
not adequately dealt with at national level this may
cause embarrassing situations and mistakes and may
lead to a sub-optimal output.
A thorough examination of the interministerial policy
coordination system as part of the preparation process
would therefore seem to be required.28 However,
coordination in the context of the presidency is not an
undisputed area. In discussions with national officials
and with officials from the Council Secretariat it appeared
that not everyone is convinced that coordination is an
important topic. Instead, some have argued that the task
of a chairman is to ensure progress within the group. The
chair can, according to this view, progress quite
independently.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to argue that
coordination of European affairs in the context of the
presidency is important and that it is much harder than
under normal circumstances. Coordination is never
easy due to, among other things, differences between
ministries with substantive interests and general
ministries and due to sensitivities involved in sharing
responsibilities. It will be even more difficult during the
presidency because of the additional workload and the
different perspectives from which coordination has to
take place.
Coordination during the presidency is not just more
difficult. It is also different. Hence member states require
not just more, but different coordination capacities.
First of all, coordination is different due to the fact that
the presidency has to live up to the three conflicting
expectations. In this respect, the country in office can be
seen as a juggler who has to keep three balls up in the air6
on a windy market square. During the presidency it is
not so much a question of formulating national
negotiating positions; the country at the helm also has to
ensure a neutral chair and be able to provide leadership.
Having argued that national interests cannot be ignored,
it is of course necessary to re-emphasize that these
interests must not stand in the way of achieving
outcomes.29 National and sectoral interests therefore
have to be suppressed when necessary. Under normal
circumstances it is an accepted part of the game that
delegations defend national interests. During the
presidency, chairmen, in the end, may have to be neutral
and national delegates should be careful not to create
unnecessary waves during meetings. This does not
mean that presidencies should always be neutral. In
some cases, member states are expected to be ambitious.
In other cases it will be possible to combine the
chairmanship role with defending national positions
(e.g. through good cooperation between chairman and
delegate). However, what is required is a continuous
checking and weighing of national and ‘presidency’
interests, and an ability to make adjustments to its role
when necessary (similar to the juggler who has to
constantly monitor his movements to keep the three
balls in the air).
Secondly, coherence between Councils may have to
be ensured. One topic, for example the preparations for
the UN climate conferences, may affect other Councils
(e.g. environment, agriculture, transport, energy and
finance). A member state should then be careful not to
present different positions in different fora, and should
see to it that outcomes of the Councils are compatible.
Coordination between Councils has always been
problematic30, because, among other reasons, the
Commission is more oriented towards progress in
individual areas. Coherence, where necessary, is
therefore the responsibility of the presidency. This
demands overview and an ability to link Councils, as
well as mechanisms to solve problems quickly in order
to prevent national differences from hindering progress
in the various Councils.
Finally, the leadership (or visionary) requirement
may demand capacities from the chair to develop longer-
term strategic views on the integration process. As
remarked above, member states have invested little in
these strategic capacities.
As a result of these differences imposed by the office
of the presidency and the different perspectives from
which coordination has to take place, a member state
needs to have different coordination systems (compared
with the ‘normal’ situation). In order to keep the three
balls up in the air, it has to continuously monitor
progress within the working parties and Councils in
order to ensure an appropriate balance between national
interests, leadership and neutrality. This requires efficient
exchange of information and an ability to solve problems
quickly. Moreover, it means that it has to be possible to
take decisions on which position to adopt, on dropping
national interests and on resuming the role of honest
broker.
The tendency of experts in substantive ministries to
let national interests dominate demands a different
balance between the substantive and general ministries.
Obviously, the technical ministries, and especially the
EU coordinators within them, are aware of the different
roles that are expected of them during the presidency.
Nevertheless, experience shows that experts may often
still find it difficult to let go of national interests when
this is required. A stronger position from the general
ministries – arguably from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs – is therefore needed in order to exchange
information, to monitor and control developments within
the Council and to take decisions. It may also be desirable
that Foreign Affairs keeps an eye on the progress within
the Council in order to detect mistakes or aberrations
from generally agreed principles (e.g. from the neutrality
principle, from agreements to avoid increases in the EU
budget, or from a decision to avoid negative
environmental implications).
Clearly, this will demand a different coordination
system in most member states because, generally,
ministries do not like to be controlled – especially not by
diplomats from Foreign Affairs who often do not hold
the strongest positions in interministerial decision-
making and who are not always admired for their
expertise. Moreover, during the presidency, a
government has to be able to take decisions quickly
whereas, under normal circumstances, decisions may
arise out of time-consuming efforts to find consensus
among ministries. Open conflicts may be irritating
when not in the chair, but should especially be avoided
during the presidency (to remain credible as chairman
and to prevent conflicts between Councils).31
Furthermore, Foreign Affairs ministries may have to
encourage sectoral ministries at an early stage to take
preparations seriously and to contact the Commission
and member states in order to ensure that documents
will be available on time and that output can be achieved
within the limited period in office. This means that
ministries, due to a natural inclination to give priority to
national issues, may have to be persuaded to spend more
time on European policies in the one or two years before
the presidency.
Such considerations impose a need to examine the
organizational strength of the EU affairs coordinators of
the Foreign Affairs ministries and of the Prime Minister’s
Office.
The coordination requirements specified here run
counter to the trend in member states to decentralize
responsibilities for European policies to the level of
individual ministries, and the weakening of the position
of Foreign Affairs ministries.32 It is quite understandable,
therefore, that questioning the appropriateness of
interministerial coordination structures during the
preparation for the presidency is a sensitive issue and
that it may be perceived by the sectoral ministries as a
threat to their autonomy. For that reason, Foreign Affairs
ministries will also be reluctant to initiate the discussion7
on their own position. Nevertheless, if this issue is not
adequately addressed, the danger looms large that the
existing system will be used without acknowledging the
differences between EU policy coordination under
normal circumstances and during the presidency.
This is not to say that member states do not set up
new structures specifically for the presidency. Often
specific task forces and teams are created around the
Prime Minister, President or the Minister of Foreign
Affairs.33 However, the point is that even these structures
are usually merely extrapolations of existing power
structures. The existing power relations remain
unaffected. For example, Foreign Affairs ministries
generally assume their traditional coordinating role
with a view to managing the presidency. Usually, the
EU affairs coordinators do not acquire more decision-
making powers or more room to monitor and control the
behaviour of experts from substantive ministries.
Extrapolating policy coordination capacities signifies
an underestimation of the specific presidency
requirements. The effects can be recognized in most
presidencies. Based on interviews with practitioners
and EU officials as well as on academic literature, some
examples34 of this can be given. The Dutch presidency
in 1991 proposed a highly federal-oriented draft for the
Treaty revision and thus extrapolated its traditional
views on European integration. Warnings from the EU
affairs coordinators and the Permanent Representation
had been taken too light-heartedly. The British
government in 1992 was criticized for applying its
pragmatic coordination system to the running of the
presidency so that it continued to defend its own interests.
The reputation of the Italian, German and Greek
presidencies underlines the standard critique of
fragmented national coordination systems.35 Finally,
the Irish were praised for their informal running of
meetings, but were rebuked for lacking the vision and
capacity to raise IGC discussions to a higher level.
This is not to say that good presidencies are rare.36
However, it seems desirable, both with a view to
managing the European integration process and for the
prestige of member states, to pay more attention to the
capacities for managing the presidency.
Managing or changing the presidency?
There is a long-standing debate about the position of the
presidency and many proposals for reform have been
put forward. The background to this debate is that the
presidency overloads member states (especially small
ones), that it is usually too fragmented to provide
leadership or to coordinate between Councils, and that
it is too costly. Various solutions for these shortcomings
have been suggested, including formalizing the
presidency’s political leadership role and increasing the
role of the Council Secretariat or the Commission. Of
course not all of the frictions in the current system can
be solved by upgrading the capacities within member
states for handling the presidency. Nevertheless, better
preparation and coordination at national level may fill
coordination and leadership gaps in decision-making
within the Council and between the institutions.
5. Conclusions and need for further study
This paper has developed two interrelated arguments.
The first deals with the tasks of the presidency. The
chair has developed into an important factor in the EU
decision-making system. But its tasks have not developed
in a one-dimensional direction. Instead, the country in
office has to be able to work under conflicting
expectations. It has to combine, when required,
neutrality, political leadership and national interests.
Current research has barely touched on these conflicting
tasks. This may explain why accounts of the position of
the presidency emphasize the honest broker role. The
danger of this is that national interests become taboo and
that the need to provide leadership within the integration
process is underestimated. It might be more realistic to
see the presidency as a juggler with three sets of tasks in
his hand.
This leads to a need to examine what presidencies
actually contribute in practice to the integration process
and whether and why they are important. Is it indeed the
case that their role is restricted, as is often stated? Or do
they in fact make a vital contribution to decision-
making? This requires more research into EU decision-
making at micro level (at the level of individual policy
issues) and into the contribution of the presidency. The
three – conflicting – tasks may provide a useful tool to
characterize the behaviour of the chair.
The second argument concerns the fact that managing
EU affairs during the presidency is not just more difficult
than under normal circumstances, but that it is different
and that different management structures are therefore
demanded. Detailed examination of the interministerial
structures for managing EU affairs is needed to validate
this point. For this purpose, a model is required which
makes it possible to describe and analyze interministerial
policy coordination mechanisms.37
The fact that different coordination structures may
be needed also implies that preparation for presidency
not only requires training officials, but also assessing
the suitability of interministerial decision-making
capacities.
These two arguments are interrelated. The different
and conflicting tasks will require appropriate
coordination mechanisms. It will therefore be interesting
to see how the behaviour of the chair is related to the way
in which a presidency is managed.
Such an exercise of comparing behaviour and
structures will be particularly relevant if it can be related
to an assessment of the success of the chair. Therefore,
a third area of research should concern the assessment
of the success of presidencies. This area has received
remarkably little attention given the central position of
the presidency in EU decision-making. One approach in
this respect would be to acknowledge that presidencies
have to carry out different tasks and to appraise them
accordingly – rather than argue that they have conflicting8
tasks and that they therefore cannot be evaluated. This
would imply peer group analysis. For example,
colleagues from the other member states in working
parties would be well placed to assess whether the chair
was effective in running meetings, steering discussions
in useful directions and handling national interests.
Moreover, the internal agenda of the chair can be
researched in order to examine what kind of balance
was chosen between national interests, leadership and
neutrality. The comparison with the management
capacities may subsequently offer an explanation for
the findings on whether the chair was effective.
These lines of research may lead to a better
understanding of the tasks of the presidency, of the
management challenges and of how to prepare for
presidency. They may also contribute to an upgrading
of the EU decision-making system. Besides, if member
states are better equipped to live up to the conflicting
expectations then there may be less need to change the
current presidency system.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article développe deux arguments qui sont reliés
entre eux. Le premier porte sur les tâches de la
présidence. La présidence s’est affirmée au cours du
temps comme un facteur important dans le système
décisionnel de l’Union européenne. Cependant ses
tâches ne se sont pas développées dans une direction
unidimensionnelle. Par ailleurs, le pays exerçant la
présidence doit être capable de travailler dans le cadre
d’attentes conflictuelles. Il doit combiner, lorsque la
situation l’impose, neutralité, leadership politique et
intérêts nationaux. La recherche en son état actuel ne
s’est pratiquement pas penchée sur ces tâches
conflictuelles, ce qui explique peut-être pourquoi les
différentes analyses de la position de la présidence se
limitent à souligner son rôle d’honnête intermédiaire.
Cette situation comporte un danger: les intérêts
nationaux risquent de devenir tabou et l’on risque de
sous-estimer la nécessité de fournir un leadership dans
le processus d’intégration. Il serait peut-être plus réaliste
de considérer la présidence comme un jongleur devant
jongler avec trois balles (séries de tâches). Ceci conduit
à la nécessité d’examiner les contributions que les
présidences apportent dans la pratique au processus
d’intégration et de se demander si elles sont importantes
et pour quelle raison.
Le deuxième argument concerne le fait que la gestion
des affaires européennes pendant la présidence n’est
pas simplement plus difficile que dans des circonstances
normales, mais qu’elle est différente et que, pour cette
raison, des structures de gestion différentes sont requises.
Ce point doit être validé par un examen détaillé des
structures interministérielles de gestion des affaires
européennes.
Le fait que l’on puisse avoir besoin de structures de
coordination différentes implique aussi que la
préparation à la présidence n’exige pas uniquement la
formation des fonctionnaires mais requiert aussi une
évaluation de l’adéquation des capacités décisionnelles
interministérielles.
Ces deux arguments sont reliés entre eux; dès lors,
il faudra des mécanismes de coordination appropriés




1. This article relates to two EIPA programmes, i.e. the
training and development programmes aimed at supporting
member states in their preparations for presidency, and the
comparative organizational study of interministerial
decision-making capacities (Schout, 1998b).
2. ‘EU presidency’ has become an accepted term, even
though it is not strictly accurate. The presidency does not
involve chairing EP or Commission meetings. It would
therefore be better, though more laborious, to refer to the
full title ‘presidency of the Council of the European
Union’.
3. In some countries, notably the UK, Finland and France,
the generalist departments also include the Prime Minister’s
office (see O’Nuallain, 1985). Ministries of Finance also
assume generalist perspectives in EU policy coordination;
given the limited space available, however, we will not
deal with them here specifically.
4. Generally, the presidency is not seen as a European
institution but as a function within the Council. Given its
importance in intergovernmental and interinstitutional
decision-making, it might, however, be regarded as a
separate institution next to Council, Commission and EP,
among others.
5. See also, for example, Blair’s statements at the start of the
British presidency that the UK would now provide
leadership in Europe. This resulted in critique from other
member states about the ‘arrogant’ British posture (see the
Financial Times, 5 January 1998). Another possible
example of overplaying the hand of the presidency is the
Dutch presidency in 1991 (for an account of the events and
the reactions from other countries, see Laursen and
Vanhoonacker, 1992 and 1994). Moreover, national and
European Parliamentarians have, in the past, shown a
great desire for active presidencies. They criticized, for
example, the recent Dutch and British presidencies on the
grounds of lack of ambition and neglect of national
interests.
6. The Guardian, 9 January 1998.
7. See Bulmer and Wessels (1978), Dinan (1994), Westlake
(1995), Hayes-Renshaw (1997).
8. For example, divisions such as North-South, net benefiter-
payer, and European-transatlantic orientation.
9. Some strong Commissions are the proverbial exceptions,
e.g. the first Delors Commission.
10. Kirchner (1992).
11. This gap has been filled to some extent by the French-
German axis. However, this has not resulted in a consistent
leadership function (cf. external relations of the EU), and
it has not always been in the interest of all 15 member9
states (especially the smaller ones). Moreover, this close
alliance has been based on close personal relations.
12. Probably the most telling expression of the confusion is
the title of ‘presidency of the European Union’, which
indicates an intergovernmental function within a federal
context. In the original concept of the Union the
Commission would assume political and mediating
functions.
13. These can be found, for example, in the Rules of Procedures
from the Council Secretariat (1979) and Wallace (1985).
Some observers have argued that the tasks should be
formalized in the Treaty (Committee of Three, 1979;
Ludlow, 1995). However, the flexibility of the current
situation allows a presidency to adapt its style to the
difficulties of specific phases in the integration process.
14. The limited space available prevents a discussion on what
the leadership role of the presidency involves. Relevant
leadership models can be found in, for example, Pfeffer
(1981, 1994) and Majone (1989, Chapter 4 ‘The uses of
constraints’).
15. See, for example, Dinan (1994) who indicates that the
major sacrifices made by the German government during
the budget negotiations in 1988 were instigated by the fact
that Germany held the presidency during the finalization
of the financial framework. See also Wurzel (1996), who
compares the environmental agendas of the British and
German presidencies and finds they are quite similar
despite the traditional differences between these countries
in this area.
16. See the example of the preparation of the climate conference
(in Kyoto) under the Dutch presidency. During its period
in office, the Netherlands stressed the importance of high
levels of protection within the EU in order to put pressure
on the other UN partners (mainly the USA and Japan).
However, after the presidency the Minister for the
Environment had to ask for lower standards because the
outcome achieved in the Environment Council was too
expensive for the Netherlands (NRC, 5 May 1998). Similar
examples can be found for other member states.
17. See, for example, Hine (1995), George and Sowemimo
(1998).
18. See, for example, Dankert (1992), or the presentations of
the presidency programmes by Foreign Affairs Ministers
to the EP. See also Rood (1997) on the preparations for the
Dutch presidency in 1997.
19. Council Guide, Vol. 1, Presidency Handbook (1996, p. 5,
emphasis in the original). This handbook also refers to the
political dimension, but limits it to establishing the order
of priority on the agenda.
20. One argument frequently used to argue in favour of
neutrality is the idea that neutrality will create goodwill.
This goodwill will serve the member states in the years
after the presidency. However, one can of course wonder
whether goodwill really pays off. Officials leave after a
few years and, in the fight for influence, goodwill may not
be a hard currency (see Rozemond, 1998).
21. Palmer (1996).
22. One example in this respect is the Dutch ministry
responsible for the environment.
23. Committee of Three (1979).
24. De Schoutheete (1997).
25. In a similar vein, Wallace (1985, p. 272) remarks that
member states emphasize current business and that little
attention is being paid to a ‘think-tank’ approach or to
longer-term planning. Her explanations for this lack of
strategic thinking include: 1) the substantive interests of
member states may stand in the way, 2) the volume of
work uses up the available energy, and 3) the 6-month
time-frame prevents the development of collective interests.
26. See, for example, the diametrically opposed assessments
of the British presidency in 1992 by Ludlow (1993) and
Garel-Jones (1993).
27. General statements on the presidency will hardly be
possible. One could argue that ‘the presidency’ does not
exist but that each of the (approximately 150) working
parties, and each of the other fora in which the 15 member
states meet during a presidency, has its own style.
28. For the sake of argument, this discussion will not explore
intraministerial capacities. For details of the link between
the intra- and interministerial management of EU affairs,
see Schout (1998a).
29. As has been the case, for example, with the previous
British presidency in 1992 (see Ludlow, 1993). Council
Secretariat officials are in a good position to give examples
of chairmen from other member states who have made
similar mistakes of confusing the presidency role with the
standard role of defending national interests.
30. Bulmer and Wessels (1978); Westlake (1995).
31. The ‘Kyoto’ case during the Dutch presidency is one
example where open conflict existed. The results were
inconsistencies between Councils and the need for the
Minister responsible for the environment to admit after
the presidency that the targets reached were too high for
the Netherlands so that they now have to be adjusted.
32. See the discussion on the domestic management of EU
affairs in Wright (1996).
33. See, for example, O’Nuallain (1985) and Humphreys
(1997).
34. Admittedly, these examples are overly simplified due the
difficulties in evaluating presidencies.
35. See, for example, Wallace (1985) and Hine (1995).
36. Even though some observers seem to suggest this (e.g.
Humphreys, 1997).
37. One such model can be found in Schout 1998a (see also
Schout 1998b). The model is based on three different
types of coordination mechanisms. These are 1)
bureaucratic coordination capacities (standard operating
procedures, general policy principles and detailed
specifications of objectives, preferred outcomes and worst-
case scenarios), 2) resources (human resources,
coordinating units and analysis of the tasks of these units),
and 3) horizontal coordination capacities (informal
relations, task forces, teams at management level,
integrating officers and the presence of managers with
decision-making powers in horizontal relations). These
coordination mechanisms provide a map to compare
capacities for managing presidencies between member
states as well as for comparing systems for normal
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